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Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking and Pricing: 







We analyse the impact of monetary policy on bank risk-taking and pricing.  Bolivia provides 
us with an excellent experimental setting to identify this impact.  Its small economy is not 
synchronized with the US economy but its banking system is almost fully dollarized.  
Consequently the US federal funds rate is the appropriate measure of monetary policy.  We 
study the impact of the federal funds rate on the riskiness and pricing of new bank loans 
granted in Bolivia between 1999 and 2003, a period of significant variation in the federal funds 
rate.  We find robust evidence that a decrease in the US federal funds rate prior to loan 
origination raises the monthly probability of default on individual bank loans. We also find 
that initiating loans with a subprime credit rating or loans to riskier borrowers with current or 
past non-performance become more likely when the federal funds rate is low.  However, loan 
spreads do not increase, seemingly even decrease, in changes in the probability of default.  
Hence banks do not seem to price the additional risk taken.  Furthermore, banks with more 
liquid assets and less funds from foreign financial institutions take more risk when the federal 
funds rate is low, and reduce loan spreads more despite the additional risk they seemingly take. 
 
Keywords: monetary policy, federal funds rate, lending standards, credit risk, subprime 
borrowers, duration analysis. 
 





“A rate cut does not just increase the supply of cash; it directly influences people’s calculations about risk.  
Cheaper money makes other assets look more attractive – an undesirable consequence at a moment when risk is 
being repriced after many years of lax lending.” 
 






Turmoil in the credit markets started in August 2007 and has continued almost unabated 
until today.  Many observers have argued that during the long period of very low interest 
rates prior to the turmoil banks had softened their lending standards,1 but may have failed to 
price the extra risks that were taken.  But while variation over time in the price of risk may be 
common across financial assets (see, for example, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Rigobon 
and Sack (2004) on equity, Manganelli and Wolswijk (2007) on bonds, and Axelson, 
Jenkinson, Strömberg and Weisbach (2007) on buyouts), to date no paper has identified this 
variation in bank loan rates.  In particular, we analyze loan pricing in conjunction with loan 
risk-taking to assess whether monetary policy affects risk-taking.  The scarcity of 
disaggregate bank loan data combined with the difficulties of identification may explain this 
gap in the literature. 
This paper starts to fill this gap by studying the pricing of risks taken by banks using 
individual loan data in an almost perfect experiment in which monetary policy was close to 
exogenous and rapidly changing.  The unique availability of several—and complementary— 
measures of risk coupled with reliable information on bank loan pricing allows us to 
eliminate alternative, demand-driven, hypotheses. 
                                                 
1
 Between 2001 and 2005 nominal rates were the lowest in almost four decades and below Taylor rates in many 
countries, while real rates were negative (see Ahrend, Cournède and Price (2008), Taylor (2007).  Borio and 
Zhu (2007), Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2008), Rajan (2006) and numerous contributions in The Wall Street 
Journal, The Financial Times and The Economist conjecture that low interest rates may result in more risk-
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To analyse the impact of monetary policy on bank risk-pricing we access the credit register 
of Bolivia from 1999 to 2003.  During this period the local currency, Bolivian Peso, was 
pegged to the US dollar and the banking system was almost fully dollarized.  The Bolivian 
monetary policy is consequently no longer independent from US monetary policy.  The US 
federal funds rate is thus the best measure (Bernanke and Mihov (1998)) of the so 
predetermined stance of Bolivian monetary policy, in particular as we only study US dollar 
denominated loans.  In addition, the Bolivian business cycle was not synchronized with the 
US business cycle. 
The credit register contains detailed contract information on all bank loans granted in 
Bolivia.  Employing a battery of time-varying duration and probit models, we study several 
loan-specific measures of bank risk-taking: time to individual loan default, current or past 
borrower default, and internal credit ratings at origination. 
We find that relaxing monetary conditions wets the risk-appetite of banks: they take more 
risk and they do not seem to price it properly.  Controlling for bank, firm, relationship, loan, 
market, macroeconomic and country-risk characteristics, a decrease in the US federal funds 
rate prior to loan origination raises the probability of default of the individual bank loans (in 
pointed contrast, a decrease in the federal funds rate over the life of the loan lowers the 
hazard rate).  Initiating loans to riskier borrowers with current or past non-performance or 
loans with a subprime credit rating also becomes more likely when the federal funds rate is 
low. 
Even more important banks do not seem to price this additional risk adequately: Spreads 
mostly decrease in the additional risk that is being taken!  This finding suggests that it is 
                                                                                                                                                       




likely that changes in credit supply (and not demand) are identified.  In addition, banks with 
more liquid assets and less funds from foreign financial institutions (who may monitor better) 
take more risk when rates are low and price this additional risk even more negatively than 
other banks.  Both findings provide further confidence that our empirical testing strategy 
identifies supply effects and suggest that lower interest rates create excessive risk-taking. 
Our paper consequently makes two contributions.  First, to the best of our knowledge this 
paper and Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2008) are the only and first papers to 
investigate the impact of monetary policy on risk-taking by banks.2  Using the Spanish credit 
register, Jiménez et al. (2008) analyse the dynamic implications of monetary policy for bank 
credit risk over a much longer time period in a larger and more developed financial market.  
This paper, by contrast, exploits better measures of ex ante risk-taking, in addition to actual 
loan performance, and shows that the baseline results in Jiménez et al. (2008) also hold in the 
Bolivian credit market – if anything an even more appropriate Mundell-Fleming type of 
economy.  Second, and its main contribution, our paper analyses the risk-pricing by banks 
and this way take identification another step further.  We find that following changes in the 
federal funds rate the extra risk taken by the banks is even negatively priced. 
                                                 
2
 The impact of changes in the short-term interest rates on the aggregate volume of credit in the economy has 
been widely analyzed (Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) among others).  Recent theoretical work shows how changes in short-term interest rates may affect credit 
risk-taking by financial institutions.  Lower interest rates by improving borrowers’ net worth may imply 
financiers to venture away from quality (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)) or to lend to borrowers with 
fewer pledgeable assets (Matsuyama (2007)).  But lower interest rates may push financiers beyond this category 
of borrowers to finance firms and projects that are actually riskier in the present (Borio and Zhu (2007)), as 
lower interest rates may reduce the threat of deposit withdrawals (Diamond and Rajan (2006)), abate adverse 
selection problems in credit markets (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006)) or improve banks’ net worth (Stiglitz 
and Greenwald (2003)).  Low levels of short-term interest rates may further lead to a search-for-yield (Rajan 
(2006)).  On the other hand, higher interest rates increase the opportunity costs for banks to hold cash (Smith 
(2002)) or reduce the banks’ net worth or charter value enough to make “gambling for resurrection” attractive 
(Kane (1989) and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000)).  Ultimately, the impact of short-term interest rates on 
credit risk-taking is a mostly unaddressed empirical question. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II further reviews our empirical strategy.  
Section III models the time to default of bank loans and introduces the variables employed in 
the empirical specifications.  Section IV presents the results.  Section V summarizes the 
results and concludes. 
II. Empirical Strategy 
To econometrically identify changes in the banks’ appetite for and pricing of risk ideally we 
would like to have: (i) changes in short-term interest rates that are not driven by local 
economic conditions; (ii) all bank loan applications (accepted or not) with detailed 
information on each of them, including loan rates.  In this ideal setting a simple regression 
would identify the impact of short-term interest rates on the banks’ appetite for risk.  We 
think this ideal setting does not exist.  However, Bolivia offers the closest setting – that we 
know of – to this ideal econometric environment.  In this section we explain why. 
During the sample period the Bolivian Peso was pegged to the US dollar and the banking 
sector was almost completely dollarized.  More than 90 percent of deposits and credits are in 
US dollars, which makes Bolivia one of the most dollarized economies among those that 
have stopped short of full dollarization.  The exchange rate regime and the dollarization 
imply that the federal funds rate is the proper measure of monetary policy in Bolivia.  In fact, 
during the sample period the correlation between the US Federal funds rate and the 3-month 
Bolivian Treasury Bill rate is 0.88 while the correlations between various measures of 
economic activity in the two countries were low. 
Our main data source is the Central de Información de Riesgos Crediticios (CIRC), the 
public credit registry of Bolivia.  The database is managed by the Bolivian Superintendent 
and all banks are required to participate.  It contains detailed information, on a monthly basis, 
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on all outstanding loans granted by any bank operating in the country.  The Register was first 
employed by Ioannidou and Ongena (2008).  We have access to information from 1999 to 
2003.  For each loan we have detailed contract information (e.g., date of initiation, maturity, 
amount, interest rate, rating, currency denomination, value and type of collateral, type of 
loan, etc.), information about the borrower (e.g., region, industry, legal status, number and 
scope of relationships, total bank debt, etc.), as well as information on ex post performance 
(e.g., for each month, we know whether a loan has overdue payments and whether it 
defaults).  We complement this dataset with bank characteristics (e.g., size, capital ratios, 
non-performing loans, liquid assets, foreign financing, etc.) from bank balance sheet and 
income statements. 
The richness of the Register allows us to construct several, complementary, measures of 
bank risk-taking.  Within the framework of a fully specified duration model we use the time 
to default as a dynamic measure of risk that allows us to disentangle the differential effects of 
monetary policy on new and outstanding loans.  In particular, we analyze the determinants of 
the hazard rate in each period, i.e., the probability that a loan defaults in period t , conditional 
on surviving until period t .  We define default (the event we wish to model) to occur when 
the bank downgrades a loan to the default status (a rating of five) and estimate how the stance 
of monetary policy—at initiation and during the “life” of the loan— affects the probability of 
default in each period.3  Ceteris paribus, the effect of monetary policy stance at initiation on 
ex post non-performance is attributed to risk-taking (i.e., the initiation of riskier loans).  
                                                 
3
 Small loans are downgraded to five if there are overdue payments for at least a certain period of time (91 days 
for collateralized loans and 121 days for loans that are not collateralized).  Large loans, instead, are downgraded 
to five when the borrower is considered insolvent (i.e., borrowers’ net worth is close to zero). 
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One concern about using ex post performance to estimate ex ante risk-taking is that banks 
did not intend to take these risks but were just caught off guard during difficult times.  To 
address this concern we also use ex ante measures of risk that were directly available to banks 
when making their loan decisions (e.g., their own internal ratings and the borrowers’ credit 
history) and examine whether the stance of monetary policy affects the probability of 
initiating new loans to borrowers with a subprime rating and credit history problems.  
The next step in our empirical strategy consists in exploiting the cross-sectional implications 
of recent theory regarding the sensitivity in bank risk-taking to monetary policy according to 
the strength of banks’ balance sheets (Diamond and Rajan (2006)) and moral hazard 
problems (Rajan (2006)).  Hence, we include interactions of the federal funds rates with these 
bank characteristics and study their impact on risk-taking. 
The final step of our empirical investigation is to study loan pricing to further identify 
whether the observed increases in riskier loans are supply-driven (i.e., it is the banks that are 
willing to take more risk when the federal funds rate is low).  If bad borrowers demand more 
loans when rates are low,4 and more loans flow to these subprime borrowers, then loans 
should exhibit higher hazard rates and spreads should increase (i.e., ceteris paribus, if the 
demand for risk increases, the price per unit of risk should also increase).  However, if the 
increase in riskier loans is supply-driven (i.e., it is the banks that are willing to take more risk, 
and not the bad borrowers that seek more credit), the price per unit of risk should drop, and it 
should drop more for banks with more liquidity and less foreign financing. 
                                                 
4
 In Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) the demand for funds from risky borrowers increases when interest rates are 
higher.  The empirical evidence on this account seems mixed (Berger and Udell (1992)). 
 
  7
III. Model and Variables 
A. Duration Model 
We analyze the time to default of an individual loan as a measure of its risk.5  The same 
methodology is also employed in Jiménez et al. (2008) making the results of the two studies 
directly comparable.  The estimates from this analysis are then used to investigate pricing. 
Let T represent the duration of time that passes before the loan defaults.  This passage of 
time is often referred to as a spell.  Repayment prevents us from ever observing a default on 
the loan, right-censoring the spell.  We will return to this issue later. 
The hazard function, )(tλ , determines the probability that default will occur at time t , 



















λ ,                 (1) 
where )(tf  is the density function associated with the distribution of spells.  The hazard 
function summarizes the relationship between the length of a spell and the likelihood of 
switching.  The hazard rate provides us effectively with a per-period measure of risk. 
When estimating hazard function, it is econometrically convenient to assume a proportional 
hazard specification, such that: 
                                                 
5
 As, for example, in McDonald and Van de Gucht (1999).  Loans to small firms typically carry a relatively 
short maturity, often without early repayment possibilities; hence, we choose to ignore early repayment behavior 
captured in their competing risk model. Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Heckman and Singer (1984b), Kiefer 
(1988), Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) and Greene (2003) provide comprehensive treatments of duration 
analysis. Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007) discuss and employ 



















,    (2) 
where tX  is a set of observable, possibly time-varying explanatory variables, β is a vector of 
unknown parameters associated with the explanatory variables, )(0 tλ  is the baseline hazard 
function and )exp( tXβ ′  is chosen because it is non-negative and yields an appealing 
interpretation for the coefficients.  The logarithm of )),(,( βλ tXt  is linear in tX .  Therefore, 
β  reflects the partial impact of each variable X on the log of the estimated hazard rate. 
The baseline hazard )(0 tλ  determines the shape of the hazard function with respect to time.  
The Weibull specification assumes 10 )( −= αλαλ tt .  This baseline hazard allows for duration 
dependence.  When 1>α  the distribution exhibits positive duration dependence.  To estimate 
)(0 tλ  one uses maximum likelihood. 
Censoring is a crucial issue to be addressed when estimating a duration model.  With no 
adjustment to account for censoring, maximum likelihood estimation of the proportional 
hazard models produces biased and inconsistent estimates of model parameters.  Accounting 
for right-censored observations can be accomplished by expressing the log-likelihood 
function as a weighted average of the sample density of completed duration spells and the 
survivor function of uncompleted spells (see Kiefer (1988)).6   
In this context, we also note that relying on the probability of individual loan default, which 
is assessed in standard probit models, may actually lead to fallacious inferences in case 
maturity changes.  Indeed, the probability of an individual loan default does not uniformly 
                                                 
6
 Controlling for left-censoring is less straightforward (Heckman and Singer (1984a)); hence, in economic 
duration analysis is often ignored.  However, we start our sample in 1999:03 and study only the new loans 
granted since then, effectively removing the left censoring problem.  As the actual time to repayment is typically 
very short, around half a year, the reduction in sample size is very small. 
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correspond to the probability of default in each period (the hazard rate) on which we will rely 
to gauge bank risk-taking and pricing.  We will briefly return to this issue later in the paper. 
Apart from analyzing the impact of interest rates prior to loan origination on the time to 
default, we also analyze the impact of monetary policy on ex ante proxies of risk-taking that 
are based on internal credit scores and lending standards.  In particular, we examine whether 
the probability of initiating loans with subprime ratings or to borrowers with bad credit 
histories (i.e., prior defaults or non-performing loans) is higher when interest rates are low. 
B. Variables 
1. Dependent Variable and Timing of the Independent Variables 
We study the impact of monetary policy on the time to default or repayment.  The mean 
time to default or repayment is six months, but varies between one and 52 months as reported 
in Table 1.  For expositional purposes we express the coefficients in terms of their impact on 
the hazard rate.  The hazard rate has an intuitive interpretation as the probability of default in 
period t , conditional on surviving until period t .  It is our main proxy for bank risk. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Say a loan l is granted in month τ , where τ  indicates calendar time.  We denote as T  the 
time to default in case of a downgrade to the default rating or the time to maturity in case of 
repayment.  Hence, either default or repayment occurs in month T+τ .  We differentiate 
between monetary policy conditions present in the month prior to the loan origination, 1−τ , 
and policy conditions prevailing during the life of the loan (i.e., from τ  to T+τ ).  In time-
varying duration models all months between τ  and 1−+ Tτ  will contribute to the estimation 
(i.e., the fact that a loan survives until a given period is used when estimating the parameters 
of the duration model).  This information is lost when estimating a probit model.  We index 
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these periods with t+τ , 10: −→ Tt .  Figure 1 clarifies the timing of the variables within 
the context of a time-varying duration model. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
2. Monetary Policy Conditions 
We measure monetary policy conditions using the monthly average of the nominal US 
federal funds rate.  Hence, we label the monetary policy measure prior to loan origination as 
1−τFundsFederal  and the measure over the life of the loan as tFundsFederal +τ .  The US 
federal funds rate averaged around 4.25% during the sample period, but varied substantially 
throughout (see Figure 2).  During an initial period of monetary policy tightening, the rate 
climbed from 4.75% in March 1999 to 6.5% in May 2000.  The rate remained at this plateau 
of 6.5% until October 2000, followed by a steep decline during a period of monetary 
expansion to 1.75% in December 2001.  The rate was then cut further to end up at 1% in 
December 2003.  The path of the US federal funds rate is largely disconnected from the 
growth rate of the gross domestic product in Bolivia (see Figure 2).  In fact, the correlation 
coefficient between these two variables is only -0.27. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
3. Bank, Firm and Relationship Characteristics 
In addition to the measures of monetary policy conditions, an array of bank, firm, 
relationship, loan, market and macroeconomic controls are included.  Table 1 defines all the 
variables employed in the empirical specifications and provides their mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, median and maximum. 
Bank characteristics, all taken in the month prior to the loan origination, include the log of 
total bank assets in millions of US dollar, 1)( −τAssetsLog , as a measure of bank size.  Better 
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possibilities for diversification or “too big to fail” perceptions (Boyd and Runkle (1993)) for 
example may entice large banks to initiate riskier loans.  The median bank in Bolivia has 
around 600 million US dollar in assets. 
Better access to liquid assets, 1)/( −τAssetsAssetsLiquid , and less financing (and therefore 
control) from foreigners, 1)/( −τAssetsFundsForeign , may allow banks to indulge in risk-
taking.  This effect may be reinforced by monetary conditions (an issue we address later by 
introducing interactions).  The mean and median of both ratios equal around ten percent. 
We also include the leverage ratio, 1)/( −τAssetsEquity , and the ratio of loans to total assets, 
1)/( −τAssetsLoans , to control for the effect that a bank’s financial and asset structure might 
have on risk management.  Finally, a backlog of non-performing loans may also temper a 
bank’s appetite for more risk; hence, we also include the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans, 1)/( −τAssetsNPL .  On average almost eight percent of the loan volume is non-
performing, with substantial variation across banks and time. 
As firm characteristics we include three dummy variables to control for the legal structure 
of the firm and eighteen industry dummies.  Using the information in the Register we also 
compute a firm’s total outstanding bank debt, 1−τDebtBank , in millions of US dollars as a 
measure of firm leverage and riskiness.  The average (median) firm borrows around 1.85 
(0.47) millions of US dollars in bank loans.  Unfortunately, we cannot match the loans with 
firm accounting information to provide additional controls (for confidentiality reasons the 
borrower’s identities have been altered).  Hence, to control for possible unobserved firm 
heterogeneity we introduce firm fixed effects in a set of corresponding linear regressions in a 
sensitivity analysis.  We use linear regressions since the estimation of the duration model 
does not permit the inclusion of firm fixed effects. 
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As the database contains the universe of Bolivian bank loans we can construct three 
comprehensive measures of the bank-firm relationships.  1−τBanksMultiple  equals one if the 
firm has outstanding loans with more than one bank, and equals zero otherwise; 
1−τBankMain  equals one if the value of loans from a bank is at least 50% of the firm’s loans, 
and equals zero otherwise; and, 1−τScope  equals one if the firm has additional products (i.e., 
used or unused credit cards, used or unused overdrafts, and discount documents) with the 
bank, and equals zero otherwise.  While more than half of the loans are taken by firms that 
have multiple bank relationships, almost three quarters of these firms borrow at least 50% 
from one bank.7  Only 25% of the loans are obtained jointly with additional bank products. 
4. Loan Characteristics 
For loan characteristics we include τAmount , τRateInterest , τCollateral , τMaturity , and 
τTypeLoan . Most loans are small to medium-sized, the average and median loan equals 
170,000 US dollars and 50,000 US dollars, respectively, but have a high loan rate of around 
14%; the average federal funds rate is 4%.  Only 27% of loans are collateralized.8  The 
median loan maturity is twelve months, while the median time to default or repayment is four 
months.  Defaults and early repayments explain the difference between the loan maturity and 
the length of a loan spell (i.e., the time between τ  and T+τ ).  To keep our estimated results 
more easily interpretable, we ignore early repayment behavior captured in competing risk 
                                                 
7
 These statistics are provided per loan.  Only around one-fifth of our sample firms have multiple bank 
relationships and there is a positive correlation between firm size and the number of relationships.  This pattern 
is consistent with findings from other countries (Ongena and Smith (2000)).  See also Guiso and Minetti (2005) 
and Ongena, Tümer-Alkan and von Westernhagen (2007) on borrower concentration. 
8
 Comparable to the degree of collateralization of small business loans in Belgium (26 %, Degryse and Van 
Cayseele (2000), but much lower than the degree of collateralization reported in the US Small Business Survey 
(53%, Berger and Udell (1995)). 
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models as lenders may have foresight about early repayment.  Finally, 71% of the loans in our 
sample are installment loans, while the remaining 29% of the loans are single-payment loans. 
It is crucial to understand the role loan conditions play in our regressions.  If banks ex ante 
correctly assess the risk on the individual and adjust loan conditions fully to “price it in”, then 
including these loan conditions should not leave any room for monetary conditions to explain 
the hazard rate unless changes in monetary conditions directly modify bank risk-appetite. 
5. Banking Market and Macroeconomic Conditions 
To capture banking market characteristics we use the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
market concentration, 1−τHHI , which is equal to the sum of the squared bank shares of 
outstanding loans, calculated per month for each region.  The mean HHI equals 0.18, 
comparable to levels for the United States and other countries (see, for example, Table 1 in 
Degryse and Ongena (2008)).  We also include twelve region dummies to capture other 
possible structural differences in the banking markets and regions at large. 
We include four variables capturing macroeconomic conditions.  The growth rate in the real 
gross domestic product in Bolivia, tBoliviaGDP +−∆ 1τ , is included to control for variations 
in the demand for bank loans over the Bolivian business cycle.  The average growth rate 
during the sample period was 1.87%,9 varying between 0.42 and 3.60%.  We further include 
the US and the Bolivian inflation rates, tUSInflation +−1τ  and tBoliviaInflation +−1τ , 
respectively.  Both inflation rates are calculated using the corresponding consumer price 
indexes.  During the sample period, the average Bolivian inflation rate was 2.72%, slightly 
higher than the average US inflation rate (2.62%), though with a more than double variation. 
                                                 
9
 All statistics in Table are computed by loan.  The mean growth rate by month equals 2.04%, slightly higher as 
the number of outstanding loans and the growth rate are not perfectly correlated. 
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Finally, we also control for changes in country risk, using the composite country risk 
indicator from the International Country Risk Guide published by the PRS Group, 
tRiskCountry +−1τ .  This indicator is available on a monthly frequency and encompasses three 
types of risk: political, financial, and economic.  According to the Guide, a value of zero 
indicates high risk, while a value between 80 and 100 indicates very low risk.  During the 
sample period, the country risk of Bolivia varied between 65 and 70. 
IV. Results 
A. Time-Varying Duration Model 
1. Estimated Coefficients 
We start with the maximum likelihood estimation of the proportional hazard model using 
the Weibull distribution as the baseline hazard rate (results for Cox proportional hazard 
models are very similar and not reported).  We report the estimated coefficients, standard 
errors and significance levels in Table 2.  Model I features only the US federal funds rate in 
the month prior to the loan origination, i.e., the variable 1−τFundsFederal .  Model II also 
includes the time-varying changes of the US federal funds rate after loan origination until 
default or repayment, tFundsFederal +τ .  This model is our benchmark specification on the 
basis of which we will make most of our further assessments and calculations. 
[Insert Table 2 here]  
The coefficients of 1−τFundsFederal  in Models I and II are negative, statistically 
significant, and equal to –0.137** and –0.150*** respectively.10  The coefficient of the 
                                                 
10
 As in the tables, we use stars next to the coefficients to indicate their significance levels: *** significant at 
1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%. 
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tFundsFederal +τ  in Model II, instead, is positive and significant at the 5% level and equals 
0.195**.  In Model III we use the monthly changes in the federal funds rate over the lifetime 
of the loan, tFundsFederal +∆ τ , instead of the level.  The results, however, are very similar. 
This is one of our main findings.  A decrease in the US federal funds rate, which under the 
exchange rate regime renders monetary conditions in Bolivia more expansionary, corresponds 
to a higher hazard rate on new loans, but a lower hazard rate on outstanding loans.  Hence 
expansionary monetary policy seems to encourage the initiation of riskier loans, but 
diminishes the hazard rate on outstanding bank loans!  This finding is in line with the results 
in Jiménez et al. (2008) for Spain.  In this paper we go a step further and also study the 
pricing of this risk under different monetary conditions. 
Before turning to an economic assessment and a deeper interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients on the federal funds rate, we briefly review the estimated coefficients on the 
other (control) variables.  Most of these coefficients are fairly stable in magnitude and 
statistical significance throughout most specifications. 
Large banks grant more risky loans, as do banks that have more loans on their books.  Banks 
with stronger balance sheets in terms of liquidity and capital take loans with higher credit 
risk.  Banks with a higher rate of non-performance in their loan portfolio continue to issue 
more risky loans, though the estimated coefficient is not always statistically significant.  
Banks with higher foreign financing, 1)/( −τAssetsFundsForeign , not surprisingly take loans 
with lower credit risk, though the coefficient is not always statistically significant.  Larger 
firms, also not surprisingly, are more likely to repay. 
The loan rate, collateral, and maturity are also relevant for the ensuing hazard rate.  Ceteris 
paribus, loans with higher loan rates, that require collateral, or have shorter maturities, have a 
higher hazard rate, suggesting that banks adjust loan conditions when they take on more risk.  
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The coefficients on 1−τFundsFederal , however, suggest that these adjustments do not 
account fully for the extra risk they are taking when interest rates are low. 
Banks in less concentrated markets grant loans with a higher hazard rate, possibly because 
more intense competition lowers lending standards (Keeley (1990)).  The inflation in Bolivia 
lowers the loan hazard rate, while inflation in the US increases it (i.e., given a nominal 
exchange an increase in the real exchange rate increases the hazard rate).  Country risk and 
the growth rate of real GDP are overall not statistically significant in determining the hazard 
rate. 
2. Paths of Monetary Policy and Bank Risk-taking 
Before turning to alternative ex ante measures of risk, we investigate the economic 
relevancy of the estimated coefficients on the federal funds variables.  We analyze how 
different “paths of monetary policy” (i.e., different combinations of 1−τFundsFederal  and 
tFundsFederal +τ ) affect the hazard rate.  Employing the coefficients of Model II in Table 2, 
we calculate an annualized hazard rate for a loan with a twelve months spell,11 but otherwise 
mean characteristics, for various different combinations of 1−τFundsFederal  and 
tFundsFederal +τ .  Figure 3 displays some of these combinations. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
For example, if the federal funds rate is equal to its sample mean throughout the loan’s life, 
the annualized loan hazard rate estimated is 1.84%.  In sharp contrast, if the federal funds rate 
is equal to its sample minimum (1.01%) at origination, but increases to its sample maximum 
(6.54%) at maturity, the loan hazard rate more than doubles to 4.98%.  On the other hand, if 
                                                 
11
 The choice of twelve months matters because the estimated parameter of duration dependence is larger than 




the “path is reversed” and the funds rate drops from its maximum to its minimum, the hazard 
rate more than halves to 0.72%.  Keeping the funds rate steady at half a percent results in 
hazard rates similar to the “path connecting the means”, 1.63% and 2.50% respectively.  
Figure 4 plots the convex contour of the estimated hazard rate for all combinations of funds 
rates between zero and ten percent. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
The estimated effects of the federal funds rate on loan hazard rates are economically 
relevant and in accordance with recent conjectures (Rajan (2006)).  During long periods of 
low interest rates banks may take on more risk and relax lending standards.  These estimates 
suggest that exposing the “hazardous” cohort of loans, granted when rates were low, to 
swiftly increasing policy rates dramatically exacerbates their “toxicity”.  But while suggestive 
of the impact of changes in monetary policy on the loan hazard rates, the estimates so far are 
really only calculated for one loan cohort at a time.  To obtain a comprehensive assessment of 
a monetary policy path on the aggregate hazard rate, cohort size and timing needs to be 
properly accounted for (for example, loans granted during the period of the increase in the 
federal fund rate will have a lower hazard rate).   
3. Bank Characteristics 
While controlling for an array of factors, the estimates could still result from changes in the 
demand for credit (though a lower interest rate actually decreases the demand from risky 
borrowers in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for example).  Models IV to VII in Table 2 aim to 
further identify the source of the changes in the hazard rate by interacting the federal funds 
rate with bank asset liquidity and borrowing from foreign financial institutions, i.e., the 
variables 1)/( −τAssetsAssetsLiquid  and 1)/( −τAssetsFundsForeign . 
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Banks with more access to liquidity, hence banks that are less constrained, may take on 
more risk and relax standards more when interest rates are low to see the default on their 
loans increase more when the federal funds rate rises (Myers and Rajan (1998)).  Banks with 
more liquidity can also refinance loans more easily when the federal funds rate is low during 
the life of the loan thereby decreasing its hazard rate.  Banks that borrow heavily from foreign 
financial institutions are expected to take less risk, either because they are subject to more 
market discipline or because the reason they have access to foreign markets in the first place 
is because they are more prudent. 
The estimates in Models IV to VII in Table 2 broadly confirm these priors, though not all 
the coefficients are statistically significant.  In unreported specifications we also include 
interactions with the log of bank assets, the capital ratio and the ratio of non-performing loans 
over assets.  Larger banks and banks with a lower capital ratio or higher ratio of non-
performing loans take more risks when the funds rate is lower.  We further drop the 
interactions with the funds rate over the life of the loan in all exercises (as theory is sharper 
about the implications for the interactions with the federal funds rate prior to origination).  
Results, however, are unaffected. 
4. Ex Ante Measures of Risk 
One concern about using ex post non-performance information to estimate the ex ante risk-
taking is that the banks never intended to take these risks and were just caught off guard 
during difficult times.  To address this concern we use three ex ante measures of riskiness 
that were all directly available to banks when making their loan decisions.  A dummy 
1−τNPLCurrent  that equals one if any of the borrower’s outstanding loans in the month prior 
to the loan initiation is non-performing, and equals zero otherwise; A dummy 
1−τDefaultPast  that equals one if in the month prior to the loan initiation the borrower has a 
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prior loan default (i.e., if it has ever defaulted on a loan in the past) and equals zero 
otherwise; And a dummy τSubprime  that equals one if the bank’s own internal credit rating 
indicated that at the time of loan origination the borrower had financial weaknesses that 
rendered the loan repayment doubtful and, therefore, was subprime (i.e., had a rating equal to 
3 or higher).  Results are tabulated in Table 3.12 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We find that lower funds rate prior to loan origination implies that banks give more loans to 
borrowers with present (Model I) or past defaults (Model II) and to borrowers with subprime 
credit scores (Model III).  We also add the change in the federal funds rate over the life of the 
loan in these three models, assuming foresight on the part of the banks.  The estimated 
coefficients on this change variable are not statistically nor economically significant, while 
the coefficients on the federal funds rate prior to loan origination retain their significance (we 
choose not to report these specifications).  Hence, banks do not seem to take into account the 
expected future developments in the federal funds rate when taking more risk at initiation.  
Finally, some bank and loan characteristics change their sign as compared to Table 2.  For 
example, banks with more liquid assets now take lower risk. 
5. Firm Fixed (Demand) Effects 
Firm characteristics may capture important changes in loan demand but our models feature 
too few of them.  Introducing firm identity dummies in a time-varying duration model is 
technically infeasible; hence, we transform the duration model into a simple linear 
specification.  We define the dependent variable to equal the actual time to default, in 
                                                 
12
 The number of loans employed for the estimation of models I-III varies because the binary dependent variable 
in the dropped cases is perfectly predicted by bank identity, firm type, industry and/or region or some 
combination of these variables. 
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months, or in case of repayment to equal twice the length of the maximum time to repayment 
during the sample period, which is equal to 96 months.13 
In Model IV we report specifications featuring the federal funds rate in the month prior to 
origination, 1−τFundsFederal , while in Model V we also include the change in the federal 
funds rate between maturity and origination, TFundsFederal +∆ τ .
14  In Models VI and VII 
we include interactions of the 1−τFundsFederal  and TFundsFederal +∆ τ  with bank 
characteristics variables 1)/( −τAssetsAssetsLiquid  and 1)/( −τAssetsFundsForeign .  Despite 
the presence of 1,880 firm fixed effects,15 the results are virtually unaffected across the board.  
Except for the interaction between 1−τFundsFederal  and 1)/( −τAssetsAssetsLiquid , the 
estimated coefficients on the two interactions with the liquidity ratio are small compared to 
the estimated coefficients on the federal funds rate. 
Firm fixed effects control for firm specific risk that is constant over the sample period.  
Consequently, when the federal funds rate is low, banks not just simply start financing risky 
firms that were excluded otherwise, but also engage in funding riskier projects (i.e., firms that 
would only have obtained loans for their safer projects when rates were high, are able to 
obtain financing for their riskier projects when rates are low). 
6. Monetary Policy, Loan Maturity and Probability of Loan Default 
“Back-of-the-envelop” OLS regressions of maturity on all predetermined variables suggest 
that maturity substantially shortens as the federal funds rate drops.  This shortening of 
                                                 
13
 This transformation broadly aligns the linear model with a duration model that controls for right censoring and 
allows for more efficient use of the available information (i.e., the time to default). 
14
 In a linear setting the time series correlation between fund rate levels starts to mar the estimations. 
15
 Industry and firm type dummies are still included as these dummies are actually loan specific and numerous 
firms are in multiple industries (in which case loan industry is indicative of its purpose) or switch industry and/or 
type over the sample period. 
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maturity over the monetary cycle makes not only controlling for maturity at origination but 
also the use of duration analysis (with a careful handling of the right censoring problem) 
imperative.  Indeed, the probability of an individual loan default (which one would rely on in 
probit models) does not uniformly correspond to the period default probability (the hazard 
rate) on which we relied on so far to gauge bank risk-taking.  The probability of individual 
loan default, which is assessed in standard probit models, may actually lead to fallacious 
inferences in case maturity changes. 






))(ˆ1(1)(ˆ1)(ˆ λ ,       (3) 
where )(ˆ Tp  is the estimated probability that the loan of maturity T defaults and )(ˆ TS is the 
estimated probability that a loan of maturity T is repaid.  In Figure 5 we specify four 
representative tracks of monetary policy rates that all finish at the maximum rate and plot the 
resulting )(ˆ Tp . 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
Figure 5 illustrates that any decrease in the federal funds rate in the month before loan 
origination, 1−τFundsFederal , will monotonically increase the estimated loan hazard rate, 
)(ˆ tλ  (of which the slopes of the convex curves are a monotonic transformation).  However if 
loan maturity T also shortens as a result of the decrease in the federal funds rate before 
origination, the probability that the loan defaults may actually drop, causing severe 
difficulties in interpreting results from binary models of loan default. 
We conclude that in order to analyze the impact of monetary policy on bank risk-taking a 
measure of default that is normalized per period (and that accounts for right censoring) is 
essential as loan maturity may also change.  Any ex post measure of actual loan default may 
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fail to capture the increase in actual risk-taking.  We leave for future research why banks try 
to offset their risk-taking by shortening loan spells (most likely only partly; in the limit loan 
spells may drop to zero and no loans may be outstanding). 
B. Pricing of Risk 
1. Main Result 
We now turn to the second main step in our analysis, the investigation of the pricing of risk, 
to more deeply analyze whether banks, not firms, are the drivers of our findings.  Banks may 
take more risk, but they may also price it and/or adjust other loan conditions.  Our results so 
far suggest that banks do not adjust loan conditions fully, as we include the four key loan 
conditions (amount, rate, collateral, and maturity) of the individual bank loans at origination 
in all regressions, but the federal funds rate variables explain loan hazard rates nevertheless.16  
Consequently, banks take more risks, but do not seem to fully adjust loan conditions. 
As we cannot know in what combinations these four (but also other secondary) conditions 
will be adjusted to compensate for the changes in risk, we focus on the loan rate as the most 
salient loan condition.  We want to investigate how loan rates reflect the different 
components of the hazard rate, in particular we want to check if the component of the hazard 
rate that is explained by monetary policy and the remaining part of the hazard rate (explained 
by all the other factors) have similar pricing implications. 
For each individual loan we first calculate, using the estimates of Model II in Table 2, a 
hazard rate at the median value of the federal funds rate in the month prior to the loan 
                                                 
16
 We cannot include loan conditions over the life of the loan, as loan conditions may not be ancillary.  An 
ancillary variable has a stochastic path that is not influenced by the duration of the spell.  Loan conditions are 
mostly fixed at origination.  But when adjusted (in the case of collateral for example) this will most likely occur 
in response to changes in the time to default of the loan. 
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origination.17  For expositional purposes, we call this variable the τRateHazardNeutral , 
considering monetary conditions “neutral” if the federal funds rate is equal to its sample 
median.  Next, we calculate the hazard rate at the actual value of the funds rate in the month 
prior to the loan origination, 1−τFundsFederal .  We label the difference between this hazard 
rate and the τRateHazardNeutral , the τRateHazardNeutral∆ .  This variable captures 
changes in the hazard rate caused by deviations in 1−τFundsFederal  from its median or 
“neutral” position.  Positive deviations correspond to higher hazard rates that result from 
expansionary monetary conditions at origination in Model II (Table 2). 
The question we try to address is: Is the banks’ appetite for risk increasing when funds rates 
are low such that banks grant loans with higher credit risk without adjusting the loan rates 
fully?  To answer this question we regress the actual loan rate, in percent, on the 
τRateHazardNeutral  and the τRateHazardNeutral∆ .  We include the monthly average 
London Interbank Offered Rate, τLIBOR , and a constant to control for interest rate levels.  
The τLIBOR  is the rate on US dollar denominated loans matched in maturity with the time to 
repayment or default of the individual bank loans.  We have access to LIBOR rates for loans 
with a maximum maturity of twelve months.  Hence, we use a sub-sample of 23,412 loans 
with spells up to one year.18  The OLS estimates are reported in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The coefficient on the constant in Model I in Table 4 suggests that the spread between loan 
rate and a zero τLIBOR  for the zero-hazard loan equals around 11%.  As expected from 
                                                 
17
 We are interested in having an equal probability of a federal funds rate increase or decrease.  Similarly, we set 
the loan rate equal to its median (to scale the hazard rate as the loan rate will be the dependent variable now).  
We take the actual values for all other independent variables. 
18
 Hazard rates are calculated on the basis of the coefficients estimated using all loans. 
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previous studies, the loan rate adjusts sluggishly to changes in the τLIBOR .
19  More 
importantly for our purposes, the coefficient on the τRateHazardNeutral  indicates that a 
one percent increase in the hazard rate leads to a 3.7% increase in the loan rate.20 
If monetary conditions before origination shift from neutral to “expansionary”, i.e., if the 
1−τFundsFederal  decreases from its median so that the τRateHazardNeutral∆  turns 
positive, the banks will actually charge less on average.  The estimated negative coefficient is 
equal to –4.138*, which is smaller than the estimated positive coefficient of 
τRateHazardNeutral , that equals +3.708***.  These differential coefficients suggest that 
the component of the hazard rate that is explained by monetary policy has no or even a 
negative effect on the loan rate, while the remaining part of the hazard rate (explained by all 
the other factors) has a positive impact on the loan rate.  Hence, banks do not seem to require 
extra compensation for the risk taken during expansionary monetary times. 
2. Interactions and Ex Ante Measures of Risk 
Models II and III include interactions between τRateHazardNeutral∆  and our two bank 
characteristics, 1)/( −τAssetsAssetsLiquid  and 1)/( −τAssetsFundsForeign .  Banks with 
more access to liquidity, hence banks that are less constrained, price the increment in the 
hazard rate less sharply than banks that are constrained.  The opposite is true for banks that 
                                                 
19
 The change in the loan rate due to a basis point change in the τLIBOR  equals 0.6*** in Model I.  This 
coefficient suggests sluggishness in loan rate adjustments, possibly due to the implicit interest rate insurance 
offered by banks (e.g., Berlin and Mester (1998)), credit rationing (e.g., Fried and Howitt (1980) and Berger and 
Udell (1992)), or the downward drift in Bolivian interest rates during our sample period.  The size of the 
coefficient on a comparable variable, i.e., the interest rate on a government security with equal maturity in 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) is around 0.3*** and 0.5***, respectively. 
20
 If the τLIBOR  is equal to two percent for example and for neutral monetary conditions, a hazard rate of zero 
percent results in a loan rate of 12.0%, while a hazard rate of two percent corresponds to a loan rate of 19.4% 
(i.e., 19.4 – 12.0 = 7.4%). 
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borrow more from foreign financial institutions, either because these foreign institutions 
monitor more or because only the more prudent banks are able to borrow abroad. 
In unreported specifications, we also include interactions with the log of bank assets, the 
capital ratio and the ratio of non-performing loans over assets.  Larger banks and banks with 
a lower capital ratio price the increment in the hazard rate less sharply (these banks also take 
more risk).  Banks with a lower ratio of non-performing loans price less sharply, which is 
somewhat surprising as these banks are also found to be less willing to take on extra risk. 
Finally, we study the pricing to borrowers with present (Model IV) or past defaults (Model 
V) and to borrowers with subprime credit scores (Model VI).  In each case we use the models 
from Table 3, i.e., Models I, II and III, to calculate the part of the probability of engaging the 
high-risk borrower that is attributable to changes in the federal funds rate.  As before, we 
label this part the τRateNeutral∆ , and regress the actual loan rate on this variable, the 
τRateNeutral  (also similarly defined as before), the τLIBOR , and a constant.  As an 
additional robustness and to maximize the number of observations (for past defaults) we 
assign the twelve-month LIBOR to loans with maturity longer than one year. 
The pricing of loans to borrowers with present or past defaults again seems to ignore the 
extra risks taken that are attributable to the changes in the federal funds rate.  The estimated 
coefficient on τRateNeutral∆  (i.e., –0.847 and –11.637***) is in both cases smaller than the 
estimated coefficient on τRateNeutral  (i.e., 6.592*** and 32.611***).  The engagement of 
subprime borrowers due to funds rate changes, on the other hand, seems almost properly 
priced: The estimated coefficients on τRateNeutral∆  and τRateNeutral  are almost equal 
(i.e., 12.470*** and 14.034***).  Of course, any ex-ante measure may fail to predict the 
actual performance of the loans and hence the pricing of the risky loan may still be 




We analyse the impact of monetary policy on bank risk-taking by accessing the credit 
register of Bolivia from 1999 to 2003.  During this period, the Bolivian Peso was pegged to 
the US dollar and the banking system was almost completely dollarized.  In addition, the 
business cycles of Bolivia and US were not correlated.  The US federal funds rate is therefore 
a proper measure of the so predetermined stance of Bolivian monetary policy. 
We find that relaxing monetary conditions increases the risk-appetite of banks.  Controlling 
for bank, firm, relationship, loan, market, macroeconomic and country-risk characteristics, a 
decrease in the US federal funds rate prior to loan origination raises the hazard rate on the 
individual bank loans.  Observing loans with a subprime credit rating or loans to riskier 
borrowers with current or past non-performance also becomes more likely when the federal 
funds rate is low, but banks do not seem to price this additional risk.  In pointed contrast, a 
decrease in the federal funds rate over the life of the loan lowers the hazard rate.   
Banks with more liquid assets and fewer funds from foreign financial institutions take more 
risk when rates are low and seem even less concerned ex ante than other banks about the 
pricing of this additional risk that is being taken. 
We are currently working to extend our study in a number of directions.  Bank portfolio 
composition may be important for risk-taking and pricing.  Also, bank ownership, in 
particular public listing, and ownership dispersion may matter for risk-taking incentives and 
the pricing of the loans.  And the effect of monetary policy on risk-taking and pricing may 
depend on bank liquidity holdings and local banking competition.  We leave all these 
extensions for future work. 
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TABLE 1.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The table defines the variables employed in the empirical specifications and provides their mean, standard deviation, minimum, median and 
maximum.  Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable.  τ is the month the loan was granted.  Variables that vary over 
time have a subscript τ+t.  The number of loan – month observations equals 156,808.  The number of loan observations equals 27,007.  
The timing of the variables is similar to the empirical models: τ-1 is the month prior to the month the loan was granted and t is during the 
life of the loan. 
 
Variables Definition Unit Mean St.Dev. Min. Med. Max.
Time to Loan Default or Repayment Time to loan default or repayment months 6.29 6.10 1 4 52
Monetary Conditions
Federal Fundsτ-1 US federal funds rate in the month prior to loan origination % 4.28 1.81 1.01 4.81 6.54
Federal Fundsτ+t US federal funds rate during the life of the loan until default of repayment % 4.03 2.12 1.01 4.99 6.54
Bank Characteristics
ln(Assets)τ−1 The log of total bank assets mln. US$ 6.27 0.73 2.79 6.43 7.27
(Liquid Assets/Assets)τ−1 Ratio of bank liquid assets over total assets % 12.61 6.51 1.43 11.06 49.08
(Foreign Funds/Assets)τ−1 Ratio of financing by foreign institutions over total assets % 10.50 8.11 0 9.05 46.43
(Debt/Assets)τ−1 Ratio of bank debt over total assets % 10.37 4.33 5.34 9.28 54.22
(Loans/Assets)τ−1 Ratio of bank loans over total assets % 71.01 6.73 9.91 71.16 86.16




Bank Borrowingτ−1 Total bank borrowing by the firm mln. US$ 1.85 3.58 0.00 0.47 45.11
Bank - Firm Relationship Characteristics
Multiple Banksτ−1 = 1 if the firm has outstanding loans with more than one bank; = 0 
otherwise
- 0.54 0.50 0 1 1
Main Bankτ−1 = 1 if the value of loans from a bank is at least 50% of the firm’s loans; = 
0 otherwise
- 0.72 0.45 0 1 1
Scopeτ−1 = 1 if the firm has additional products (i.e., credit card used or not used, 
overdraft used or not used, and discount documents) with a bank; = 0 
otherwise
- 0.25 0.43 0 0 1
Loan Characteristics
Amountτ Loan amount mln. US$ 0.17 0.49 0.00 0.05 12.21
Rateτ Loan rate % 13.96 2.64 0.16 14.5 35
Collateralτ = 1 if loan is collateralized; = 0 otherwise - 0.27 0.45 0 0 1
Maturityτ Loan maturity months 20.00 22.58 0 11.83 180.43
Typeτ = 1 if loan is an installement loan; = 0 otherwise - 0.71 0.45 0 1 1
Banking Market Characteristics
Herfindahl Hirschman Indexτ−1 The sum of squared bank shares of outstanding loans calculated per 
month for each region
- 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.16 1
Macro Conditions
∆ GDP Boliviaτ−1 Growth in the gross domestic product in Bolivia % 1.87 0.80 0.42 2.04 3.60
Inflation USτ−1 Monthly change in the US consumer price index % 2.62 0.74 1.07 2.65 3.70
Inflation Boliviaτ−1 Monthly change in the Bolivian consumer price index % 2.72 1.66 -1.23 2.71 6.42
ICRG Country Risk Measureτ−1 = 100 if low risk; = 0 if high risk.  Composite country risk indicator 
encompassing political, financial, and economic risk
- 67.49 1.13 64.80 67.50 69.80
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TABLE 2.  TIME-VARYING DURATION MODELS 
The estimates this table lists are based on ML estimation of the proportional hazard model using the Weibull distribution as the baseline hazard 
rate.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The number of loan – month observations equals 156,808.  The number of loan 
observations equals 27,007.  Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable.  τ is the month the loan was granted.  Variables that 
vary over time have a subscript that includes t.  All estimates are adjusted for right censoring.  Coefficients are listed in the first column and the 
standard errors are reported between brackets in the second column.  *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Independent Variables I II III IV V VI VII
Monetary Conditions
Federal Fundsτ-1 -0.137 [0.056] ** -0.150 [0.057] *** -0.133 [0.057] ** 0.127 [0.124] -0.212 [0.073] *** 0.017 [0.124] -0.256 [0.069] ***
Federal Fundsτ+t 0.195 [0.092] ** 0.066 [0.106] 0.151 [0.120]
∆ Federal Fundsτ+t 1.056 [0.417] ** -0.273 [0.699] 0.415 [0.693]
Monetary Conditions and Bank Characteristics
Federal Fundsτ-1 * (Liquid Assets/Assets)τ−1 -0.018 [0.007] ** -0.009 [0.007]
Federal Fundsτ-1 * (Foreign Funds/Assets)τ−1 0.017 [0.008] ** 0.021 [0.008] ***
Federal Fundsτ+t * (Liquid Assets/Assets)τ−1 0.013 [0.005] ***
Federal Fundsτ+t * (Foreign Funds/Assets)τ−1 0.005 [0.004]
∆ Federal Fundsτ+t * (Liquid Assets/Assets)τ−1 0.105 [0.053] **
∆ Federal Fundsτ+t * (Foreign Funds/Assets)τ−1 0.053 [0.042]
Bank Characteristics
ln(Assets)τ−1 2.861 [0.604] *** 2.897 [0.606] *** 2.872 [0.605] *** 2.985 [0.623] *** 3.033 [0.591] *** 3.058 [0.611] *** 3.058 [0.587] ***
(Liquid Assets/Assets)τ−1 0.050 [0.025] ** 0.047 [0.025] * 0.049 [0.025] * 0.090 [0.035] ** 0.048 [0.025] * 0.094 [0.035] *** 0.054 [0.025] **
Foreign Funds/Assets)τ−1 0.013 [0.010] 0.007 [0.011] 0.009 [0.010] -0.002 [0.012] -0.084 [0.034] ** 0.001 [0.012] -0.079 [0.035] **
(Debt/Assets)τ−1 0.158 [0.035] *** 0.163 [0.036] *** 0.159 [0.035] *** 0.142 [0.036] *** 0.176 [0.031] *** 0.135 [0.035] *** 0.170 [0.031] ***
(Loans/Assets)τ−1 0.082 [0.027] *** 0.073 [0.027] *** 0.076 [0.027] *** 0.089 [0.028] *** 0.076 [0.028] *** 0.082 [0.027] *** 0.086 [0.028] ***
(Non-Performing Loans/Assets)τ−1 0.025 [0.022] 0.040 [0.023] * 0.035 [0.022] 0.066 [0.028] ** 0.076 [0.028] *** 0.060 [0.026] ** 0.067 [0.027] **




Bank Borrowingτ−1 -0.186 [0.054] *** -0.183 [0.054] *** -0.186 [0.054] *** -0.189 [0.054] *** -0.185 [0.054] *** -0.187 [0.054] *** -0.190 [0.054] ***
Type (3) and Industry (18) Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Bank - Firm Relationship Characteristics
Multiple Banksτ−1 0.039 [0.158] 0.030 [0.157] 0.037 [0.158] 0.024 [0.155] 0.041 [0.156] 0.026 [0.156] 0.050 [0.157]
Main Bankτ−1 -0.291 [0.179] -0.279 [0.179] -0.293 [0.179] -0.266 [0.179] -0.242 [0.180] -0.282 [0.178] -0.258 [0.180]
Scopeτ−1 0.451 [0.129] *** 0.453 [0.129] *** 0.451 [0.129] *** 0.475 [0.128] *** 0.457 [0.129] *** 0.466 [0.129] *** 0.447 [0.129] ***
Loan Characteristics
Amountτ 0.279 [0.179] 0.257 [0.184] 0.269 [0.182] 0.284 [0.169] * 0.281 [0.177] 0.272 [0.174] 0.296 [0.172] *
Rateτ 0.332 [0.035] *** 0.332 [0.035] *** 0.333 [0.035] *** 0.327 [0.036] *** 0.338 [0.036] *** 0.333 [0.035] *** 0.336 [0.036] ***
Collateralτ 0.763 [0.165] *** 0.774 [0.163] *** 0.763 [0.164] *** 0.792 [0.165] *** 0.759 [0.166] *** 0.780 [0.165] *** 0.754 [0.166] ***
Maturityτ -0.058 [0.008] *** -0.057 [0.009] *** -0.058 [0.008] *** -0.058 [0.009] *** -0.057 [0.009] *** -0.058 [0.008] *** -0.057 [0.008] ***
Typeτ -0.038 [0.177] -0.085 [0.180] -0.054 [0.179] -0.090 [0.181] -0.097 [0.181] -0.069 [0.177] -0.050 [0.179]
Banking Market Characteristics
Herfindahl Hirschman Indexτ−1 -6.999 [2.376] *** -7.183 [2.350] *** -6.883 [2.346] *** -7.082 [2.382] *** -7.207 [2.332] *** -6.694 [2.348] *** -6.895 [2.331] ***
Region (12) Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Macro Conditions
∆ GDP Boliviaτ−1+t 0.247 [0.140] * 0.194 [0.147] 0.332 [0.147] ** 0.157 [0.151] 0.165 [0.149] 0.314 [0.149] ** 0.321 [0.149] **
Inflation USτ−1+t 0.358 [0.186] * 0.393 [0.188] ** 0.441 [0.187] ** 0.357 [0.191] * 0.374 [0.189] ** 0.434 [0.189] ** 0.427 [0.188] **
Inflation Boliviaτ−1+t -0.224 [0.055] *** -0.304 [0.064] *** -0.300 [0.066] *** -0.307 [0.065] *** -0.315 [0.065] *** -0.291 [0.067] *** -0.302 [0.066] ***
ICRG Country Risk Measureτ−1+t 0.148 [0.089] * 0.121 [0.093] 0.228 [0.101] ** 0.089 [0.096] 0.111 [0.095] 0.204 [0.102] ** 0.234 [0.102] **
Month (11) and Deposit Insurance Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -47.03 [7.327] *** -45.62 [7.477] *** -52.35 [8.250] *** -46.06 [7.685] *** -46.21 [7.354] *** -53.07 [8.302] *** -54.74 [8.203] ***
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TABLE 3.  LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS 
The estimates this table lists are based on probit (Models I to IV) and OLS (Models V to VIII) estimations.  The dependent variables are: A 
dummy 1−τNPLCurrent  that equals one if any of the borrower’s outstanding loans in the month prior to the loan initiation is non-
performing, and equals zero otherwise; A dummy 1−τDefaultPast that equals one if in the month prior to the loan initiation the borrower 
has a prior loan default (i.e., if it has ever defaulted on a loan in the past) and equals zero otherwise; And a dummy τSubprime  that equals 
one if the bank’s own internal credit rating indicated that at the time of loan origination the borrower had financial weaknesses that 
rendered the loan repayment doubtful and, therefore, was subprime (i.e., had a rating equal to 3 or higher).  τDefaulttoTime  equals the 
actual time to default or in case of repayment set equal to 96, in months.  The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 1.  The 
number of loan observations is indicated in the Table.  Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable.  τ is the month the 
loan is granted.  τ+T is the month the loan is repaid or defaults.  Coefficients are listed in the first column and the standard errors are 
reported between brackets in the second column.  *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Independent Variables I II III IV V VI VII
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable Current NPL Past Default Subprime Time to Default Time to Default Time to Default Time to Default
Monetary Conditions
Federal Fundsτ-1 -0.092 [0.025] *** -0.145 [0.064] ** -0.059 [0.030] ** 0.204 [0.107] * 0.341 [0.107] *** 0.850 [0.154] *** 0.501 [0.110] ***
∆ Federal Fundsτ+T -1.101 [0.126] *** -1.471 [0.244] *** -0.283 [0.187]
Monetary Conditions and Bank Characteristics
Federal Fundsτ-1 * (Liquid Assets/Assets)τ−1 -0.037 [0.006] ***
Federal Fundsτ-1 * (Foreign Funds/Assets)τ−1 -0.038 [0.007] ***
∆ Federal Fundsτ+T * (Liquid Assets/Assets)τ−1 0.031 [0.017] *
∆ Federal Fundsτ+T * (Foreign Funds/Assets)τ−1 -0.075 [0.017] ***
Bank Characteristics
ln(Assets)τ−1 0.508 [0.195] *** -0.522 [0.915] 0.031 [0.175] 1.350 [0.722] * 1.563 [0.716] ** 2.822 [0.779] *** 0.499 [0.732]
(Liquid Assets/Assets)τ−1 -0.013 [0.006] ** -0.046 [0.021] ** -0.002 [0.008] 0.008 [0.019] -0.012 [0.019] 0.101 [0.030] *** 0.012 [0.019]
Foreign Funds/Assets)τ−1 0.019 [0.004] *** 0.003 [0.021] -0.004 [0.005] -0.108 [0.025] *** -0.160 [0.025] *** -0.181 [0.027] *** 0.089 [0.046] *
(Debt/Assets)τ−1 0.037 [0.010] *** 0.026 [0.056] -0.011 [0.011] -0.072 [0.045] -0.118 [0.044] *** -0.141 [0.044] *** -0.132 [0.044] ***
(Loans/Assets)τ−1 0.015 [0.006] *** 0.006 [0.021] 0.002 [0.010] -0.056 [0.022] *** -0.101 [0.021] *** -0.097 [0.021] *** -0.097 [0.020] ***
(Non-Performing Loans/Assets)τ−1 -0.001 [0.008] 0.004 [0.036] 0.037 [0.008] *** -0.346 [0.036] *** -0.273 [0.036] *** -0.221 [0.036] *** -0.346 [0.038] ***




Bank Borrowingτ−1 0.008 [0.004] ** -0.165 [0.038] *** -0.005 [0.005] 0.103 [0.029] *** 0.096 [0.029] *** 0.095 [0.029] *** 0.095 [0.029] ***
Type (3) and Industry (18) Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Bank - Firm Relationship Characteristics
Multiple Banksτ−1 0.785 [0.042] *** -0.353 [0.165] ** -0.002 [0.047] 0.409 [0.240] * 0.339 [0.241] 0.347 [0.241] 0.324 [0.241]
Main Bankτ−1 -0.250 [0.034] *** -0.578 [0.176] *** -0.255 [0.048] *** 0.524 [0.181] *** 0.450 [0.181] ** 0.473 [0.181] *** 0.390 [0.180] **
Scopeτ−1 0.474 [0.030] *** 0.216 [0.098] ** 0.198 [0.037] *** -0.533 [0.185] *** -0.556 [0.184] *** -0.547 [0.184] *** -0.508 [0.184] ***
Loan Characteristics
Amountτ 0.003 [0.039] 0.313 [0.063] *** 0.185 [0.028] *** 0.028 [0.142] 0.004 [0.142] 0.028 [0.144] 0.040 [0.144]
Rateτ 0.178 [0.010] *** 0.115 [0.021] *** 0.206 [0.012] *** -0.573 [0.056] *** -0.561 [0.056] *** -0.548 [0.056] *** -0.569 [0.056] ***
Collateralτ 0.216 [0.037] *** 0.331 [0.126] *** 0.136 [0.044] *** -1.178 [0.222] *** -1.116 [0.221] *** -1.094 [0.220] *** -1.101 [0.219] ***
Maturityτ 0.004 [0.001] *** 0.006 [0.002] *** 0.010 [0.001] *** 0.003 [0.007] 0.016 [0.007] ** 0.015 [0.007] ** 0.015 [0.007] **
Typeτ -0.138 [0.032] *** -0.041 [0.094] -0.187 [0.040] *** -0.854 [0.177] *** -0.770 [0.175] *** -0.779 [0.175] *** -0.858 [0.176] ***
Banking Market Characteristics
Herfindahl Hirschman Indexτ−1 -3.950 [0.538] *** -3.777 [1.988] * -7.052 [0.858] *** 9.370 [2.533] *** 8.781 [2.515] *** 8.825 [2.502] *** 9.275 [2.508] ***
Region (12) Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Macro Conditions
∆ GDP Boliviaτ−1 0.033 [0.020] * -0.162 [0.072] ** -0.059 [0.027] ** 0.217 [0.079] *** 0.403 [0.083] *** 0.423 [0.083] *** 0.371 [0.083] ***
Inflation USτ−1 -0.042 [0.039] -0.021 [0.111] 0.119 [0.046] *** -1.356 [0.166] *** -0.970 [0.168] *** -0.964 [0.168] *** -0.667 [0.167] ***
Inflation Boliviaτ−1 0.034 [0.021] 0.070 [0.059] 0.008 [0.022] 0.172 [0.070] ** 0.164 [0.070] ** 0.115 [0.071] 0.204 [0.071] ***
ICRG Country Risk Measureτ−1 -0.067 [0.019] *** -0.032 [0.059] 0.019 [0.023] -0.122 [0.073] * 0.047 [0.074] 0.086 [0.074] 0.075 [0.073]
Month (11) and Deposit Insurance Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -4.02 [1.971] ** 3.68 [8.036] -5.68 [2.178] *** 107.42 [8.105] *** 96.18 [8.143] *** 83.06 [8.489] *** 99.44 [8.191] ***
Number of Loan Observations 29,831 17,871 29,368 29,900 29,900 29,900 29,900
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TABLE 4.  PRICING OF RISK-TAKING 
The estimates this table lists are based on OLS estimation.  The dependent variable is the actual loan rate, in percent.  The 
τRateHazardNeutral  used in models I to III is calculated on the basis of the coefficient estimates of Model II in Table 2 at the median value 
of the federal funds rate in the month prior to origination (as the loan rate is the dependent variable we set it equal to its median value as well); 
all other independent variables are set equal to their actual values.  The τRateHazardNeutral∆  used in Models I to III is the difference 
between the hazard rate at the actual value of the federal funds rate in the month prior to origination and the τRateHazardNeutral .  The 
τRateNeutral  and τRateNeutral∆  used in Models IV to VI, are similarly calculated on the basis of the coefficient estimates of Models I to III 
in Table 3.  The τ,lLIBOR  is the average monthly London Interbank Offered Rate in US dollars and matched in maturity to the bank loan (loans 
with a maturity longer than one year are matched to the one year LIBOR).  The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 1.  The 
number of observations equals 23,412 (as loans with a maturity longer than one year are dropped), 28,699, 17,434 and 28,234, respectively.  
Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable.  τ is the month the loan was granted.  Coefficients are listed in the first column 
and the standard errors are reported between brackets in the second column.  *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Independent Variables I II III
Neutral Hazard Rateτ 3.708 [1.635] ** 3.138 [1.551] ** 3.691 [1.638] **
∆ Neutral Hazard Rateτ -4.138 [2.193] * 17.785 [4.014] *** -5.962 [2.300] ***
∆ Neutral Hazard Rateτ * (Liquid Assets/Assets)τ−1 -0.691 [0.103] ***
∆ Neutral Hazard Rateτ * (Foreign Funds/Assets)τ−1 0.322 [0.126] **
LIBORτ 0.624 [0.009] *** 0.646 [0.009] *** 0.624 [0.009] ***
Constant 10.785 [0.043] *** 10.675 [0.046] *** 10.789 [0.043] ***
Number of Loan Observations 23,412 23,412 23,412
Independent Variables IV V VI
Rate Current NPL Past Default Subprime
Neutral Rate τ 6.592 [0.114] *** 32.611 [1.163] *** 14.034 [0.213] ***
∆ Neutral Rate τ -0.847 [1.543] -11.637 [1.793] *** 12.470 [2.690] ***
LIBORτ 0.483 [0.059] *** 0.170 [0.073] ** 0.904 [0.056] ***
Constant 10.965 [0.768] *** 16.357 [0.890] *** 3.874 [1.349] ***
Number of Loan Observations 28,699 17,434 28,248
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FIGURE 1.  THE TIMING OF THE MONETARY POLICY VARIABLES IN THE TIME-VARYING DURATION ANALYSIS 





Loan origination Loan repayment or default 
t: the monthly period (t:1 to T) 
T: Time to repayment or default 
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FIGURE 2. THE US FEDERAL FUNDS RATE, THE GROWTH IN BOLIVIAN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND THE US INFLATION RATE 










































































































































FIGURE 3. MONETARY POLICY PATHS AND LOAN HAZARD RATE 
The figure displays various paths for the Federal Funds rate (in%) and the resulting 
annualized Loan Hazard Rate (in%) calculated for a loan with a maturity of twelve months 
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FIGURE 4. FEDERAL FUNDS RATES BEFORE LOAN ORIGINATION AND UNTIL MATURITY 
(ONE YEAR) AND THE LOAN HAZARD RATE 
The figure displays the 1−τFundsFederal , in the month before the loan origination date τ-1, 
on the left horizontal axis, the tFundsFederal +τ , until maturity τ + t, on the right 
horizontal axis, and the resulting annualized loan Hazard rate calculated for a loan with a 
maturity of twelve months but otherwise mean characteristics on the vertical axis.  All 




FIGURE 5. THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE AT LOAN ORIGINATION, MATURITY AND INTEGRATED HAZARD RATE 





))(ˆ1(1)(ˆ1)(ˆ λ .  The estimated 
loan hazard rate )(ˆ tλ , with t: 0 to T, is calculated for each individual loan on the basis of the coefficient estimates in Model II of Table 2 and 
the mean values of all independent variables, with the exception of the 1−τFundsFederal , which equals 1.01% (minimum), 4.28% (mean), 
6.54% (maximum) and 10%, respectively, and the 1−+TFundsFederal τ  which in all four cases equals 6.54% (maximum).  (1) A decrease in the 
Federal Funds rate in the month before the origination of the loan will (2) monotonically increase the loan hazard rate )(ˆ tλ .  (3) If loan 
maturity T shortens however, as a result of the decrease in the federal funds rate, (4) the probability that a loan defaults can also decrease, 
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= 1.01% = 4.28% = 6.54% = 10%
... λ(t) increases, ..
.. but T may also decrease ..
.. such that p(T) decreases.
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